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This paper examines the relationship between the ﬁrm’s direct ties, its inter-ﬁrm network
prominence and its likelihood of being acquired. The authors argue that ﬁrm’s direct ties
and prominence enhance the ﬁrm’s visibility and signal its quality – and thus foster the
ﬁrm’s likelihood of being acquired. However, higher levels of direct ties and prominence,
by providing access to resources and the ﬁrm’s status, respectively, increase the ﬁrm’s
ability to remain independent and thus reduce its likelihood of being acquired. Thus, the
authors posit the overall relation as an inverted U-shaped. Furthermore, they show that,
for ﬁrms that undergo an initial public offering, the aforementioned relation becomes
much weaker. The hypotheses are empirically tested in the biopharmaceutical industry
and important theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.
Introduction
In addition to Amylin, BioSeek has had collabora-
tionswith numerous pharmaceutical and biotechnol-
ogy companies including Merck-Serono, UCB, and
Dainippon Sumitomo. (BusinessWire, 2009)
The quote from Asterand Bioscience’s announce-
ment of its acquisition of BioSeek Inc. in 2009
is an example of the importance a target’s inter-
ﬁrm agreement to prospective acquirers. Surpris-
ingly, social capital (SC) literature has still not
examined how a ﬁrm’s network position inﬂuences
its likelihood of being acquired. Past work on the
impact of network positions has focused on re-
lated topics such as the ﬁrm’s survival (Bru¨derl
and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998;Mitchell and Singh, 1996;
Uzzi, 1996; Watson, 2007), the ﬁrm’s dissolution
(Pennings, Lee and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998) and
the ﬁrm’s propensity tomake acquisitions ormerg-
ers (Haunschild, 1993; Hoang, 1997; Lin et al.,
2009; Yang, Lin and Peng, 2011). Further, research
on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has not used
a network perspective, but, rather, has focused on
dyadic relations between the target and acquirer
(i.e. be they customers, suppliers or competitors).
This gap is also relevant from a managerial point
of view. Most ﬁrms looking for a possible buyer
highlight their inter-ﬁrm relations among the ‘rea-
sons to be bought’. Furthermore, market business
intelligence websites routinely provide information
on the ﬁrm’s inter-organizational deal activity (see
for instance https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com).
In this research, we aim to ﬁll this gap by pro-
viding possible explanations on how and why a
ﬁrm’s network position inﬂuences its likelihood of
being acquired. We build on signaling and net-
work theories to explain how and why the ﬁrm’s
direct ties and prominence in its ego network in-
ﬂuence its likelihood of being acquired. In this
paper, the focus is on inter-ﬁrm networks based
on company-to-company relationships (Grandori
and Soda, 1995).
We argue that the ﬁrm’s direct ties and promi-
nence are ‘visibility-enhancing signals’ (Pollock
and Gulati, 2007) that allow the ﬁrm to ‘stand-out
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from the crowd’ and get noticed by potential ac-
quisition suitors. Moreover, the ﬁrm’s direct ties
and network prominence signal the ﬁrm’s quality,
which helps to reduce the information asymmetry
between the ﬁrm and the market (Ozmel, Reuer
and Gulati, 2013; Stuart, 2000), thus increasing its
likelihood of being acquired.
However, ﬁrms with high levels of direct ties
have access to valuable resources that improve ﬁrm
performance, boosting the ﬁrm’s organic growth
and, therefore, reducing the likelihood of its acqui-
sition (Ahuja, 2000; Gilsing et al., 2008; Koka and
Prescott, 2002; Salman and Saives, 2005; Schilling
and Phelps, 2007; Soh, 2003; Vanhaverbeke, Gils-
ing and Duysters, 2009, 2012; Wincent et al., 2013;
Wu, 2008; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Zaheer et al,
2010). Furthermore, a highly prominent ﬁrm sig-
nals its status, which enhances its organizational
performance and thus contributes to the ﬁrm’s de-
velopment and independence (Ozmel, Reuer and
Gulati, 2013; Podolny, 1993, 2001; Shipilov and Li,
2008).
We build on these ﬁndings from SC research
to construct a theoretical framework that explains
why ego ﬁrm’s direct ties and network prominence
have an invertedU-shaped relation to its likelihood
of being acquired by a predator.
Further, we build onmultiple signaling literature
(Pollock and Gulati, 2007) to explain how initial
public offerings (IPOs) interact with the aforemen-
tioned inverted U-shaped relations. Indeed, pre-
vious literature has largely indicated how IPOs
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s likelihood of being
acquired (Field and Karpoff, 2002; Hovakimian
and Hutton, 2010; Jain and Kini, 1999; Ragozzino
and Reuer, 2007).
We test our theoretical framework on a net-
work of inter-ﬁrm relationships of 2083 biophar-
maceutical companies over the period 2001–2010.
We found signiﬁcant support for an inverted
U-shaped relation between the ﬁrm’s direct ties,
network prominence and its likelihood of being ac-
quired. For ﬁrms that have an IPO, the relation be-
tween network positions and their likelihood of be-
ing acquired is signiﬁcantly weakened.
Our study contributes to the SC literature by
showing mechanisms through which a ﬁrm’s net-
work position inﬂuences its likelihood of being
acquired. In particular, our study highlights the
connection between differences in network embed-
dedness and the signaling effect of visibility and
quality, on the one hand, and the effect of status
and resource access, on the other hand, to produce
an inverted U-shaped relation between the ﬁrm’s
network positions and its likelihood of being ac-
quired. Finally, we contribute to multiple signal-
ing literature by showing the interaction between
two different signals that a ﬁrm can launch: signals
emanating from its network positions and from an
IPO event.
In the next section, we present the theoretical
framework. We then explain our methods. Finally,
we discuss the results and their theoretical and
managerial implications.
Theory and hypotheses
The role of direct ties
Direct ties are one of the most considered network
embeddedness features in SC literature (Ahuja,
2000;Koka andPrescott, 2002; Salman and Saives,
2005; Vanhaverbeke, Gilsing and Duysters, 2012;
Wu, 2008). We argue that ﬁrm’s direct ties have a
signaling and a resource access effect. As a ﬁrm’s
direct ties increase, the ﬁrm stands out from the
crowd (e.g. Gulati and Higgins, 2003), thus in-
creasing its likelihood of being acquired. At the
same time, the ﬁrm also gains access to valuable
resources through its direct ties, which allow the
ﬁrm to grow (e.g. Ahuja, 2000) to a point where its
strength reduces its likelihood of being acquired.
Consequently, the overall impact of ﬁrm’s direct
ties on its likelihood of being acquired is an in-
verted U-shaped relation.
Building on signaling theory, an acquisition de-
cision can be regarded as an information asymme-
try problem (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al.,
2011; Spence, 1973, 2002). The predator – the ac-
quiring ﬁrm – faces difficulty in assessing whether
a possible prey has the quality it claims to possess.
According to signaling theory, an effective signal
creates a separate equilibrium between a prey that
has high-quality resources versus one that does
not, thus reducing or even nullifying the adverse
selection problem. Connelly et al. (2011) highlight
studies where signaling theory has been applied ex-
tensively to explain how young ﬁrms signal their
quality to potential IPO investors through differ-
ent signals, such as board characteristics (Certo,
2003; Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev
and Bishop, 2002), former investments (Elitzur
and Gavious, 2003; Janney and Folta, 2003, 2006),
ownership (Bruton et al., 2009; Busenitz, Fiet
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and Moesel, 2005; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002;
Jain, Jayaraman and Kini, 2008) and top manage-
ment quality and reputation (Coff, 2002; Cohen
and Dean, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2006; Jain,
Jayaraman and Kini, 2008; Zimmerman, 2008).
Scholars have also recognized network positions
as signals (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Nicholson,
Danzon and McCullough, 2005; Ozmel, Reuer
and Gulati, 2013; Stuart, 2000; Stuart, Hoang
and Hybels, 1999). Stuart, Hoang and Hybels
(1999) and Stuart (2000) suggest that inter-ﬁrm
relationships are signals that convey social sta-
tus and recognition to existing and potential cus-
tomers. According to Gulati and Higgins (2003),
ties to prominent actors reﬂect a young ﬁrm’s value
and mitigate the different types of uncertainty a
ﬁrm faces. Nicholson, Danzon and McCullough
(2005) ﬁnd that biotech companies that sign inter-
organizational deals with pharmaceutical compa-
nies send a positive signal to prospective investors
and receive substantially higher valuations. Fi-
nally, Ozmel, Reuer and Gulati (2013) show how
a new venture’s prominent position in networks of
company-to-company relationships can signal its
quality and future prospects when it is costly to
form and maintain such relationships. However,
in order to reduce uncertainty, signals must ﬁrst
attract the attention of those who use them (Pol-
lock and Gulati, 2007). In particular, we need to
focus on how a signal increases a ﬁrm’s likelihood
of inclusion in the ‘consideration sets’ (Pollock and
Gulati, 2007), i.e. in the possible list of prey. As a
ﬁrm’s direct ties increase, it launches a visibility-
enhancing signal and the ﬁrm ‘stands out from
the crowd’ (Pollock andGulati, 2007).Moreover, a
ﬁrm’s direct tie may be with a potential buyer. Pre-
vious relations are a highly signiﬁcant driver of ac-
quisitions (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Gulati,
1995, 1998), since they make it possible for a ﬁrm
to gather valuable information about its partner’s
resources, capability and reliability – thus mak-
ing the information asymmetry problem less se-
rious and, consequently, increasing the partner’s
likelihood of being acquired (Vanhaverbeke, Gils-
ing and Duysters, 2002).
At the same time, ﬁrm’s direct ties signal its
resource quality, higher reputation and trustwor-
thiness. A ﬁrm with more direct ties is, indeed,
probably sought after by other ﬁrms because of
its valuable resources, such as knowledge, technol-
ogy, patents and products that it can share with
its partners (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Inkpen,
1998;Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Zhang,
Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2007). Further-
more, a ﬁrm’s level of direct ties also reﬂects
its capability to deal with inter-ﬁrm relationships
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Barkema and Ver-
meulen, 1998; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002;
Kale and Singh, 200; Villalonga and McGahan,
20057; Wang and Zajac, 2007) signaling in this
way its reputation and trustworthiness (Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Gulati, Nohria and Za-
heer, 2000; Hagedoorn, Roijakkers and Kranen-
burg, 2006; Parkhe, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven,
1992). Thus, direct ties act as a ‘prism’ that re-
ﬂects information cues about the quality of the
ﬁrm (Podolny, 2001; Soh,Mahmood andMitchell,
2004) reducing the information asymmetry be-
tween itself and the market – and thus increasing
its likelihood of being acquired.
Summarizing, the signaling effect of direct ties
increases the visibility of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s visi-
bility also becomes a signal of its quality, and the
probability of its acquisition further increases.
Nevertheless, at high levels of direct ties, the re-
source effect becomes relatively more signiﬁcant
than the signaling effect. Firms with relatively
higher direct ties have greater direct access to valu-
able resources such as information (Ahuja, 2000;
Gulati, 1999), capabilities and learning (Powell,
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996) and assets such as
knowledge, technology, patents and services (Hol-
comb and Hitt, 2007; Inkpen, 1998; Mowery, Ox-
ley and Silverman, 1996; Zhang, Baden-Fuller and
Mangematin, 2007). For instance, Gulati (1999)
highlights the concept of network resources, i.e.
how ﬁrms derive resource beneﬁts from their net-
work positions.
A ﬁrm with many direct ties is likely to develop
the necessary internal capabilities to absorb, inter-
nalize or exploit external resources (Anand and
Khanna, 2000; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998;
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Kale and Singh,
2007; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Wang and
Zajac, 2007). From the seminal work of Uzzi
(1996), subsequent network-based scholars have
focused on evaluating the impact of direct ties on
the ﬁrm’s economic–ﬁnancial performance (Baum,
Calabrese Silverman, 2000; Koka and Prescott,
2002; Wu, 2008) and innovation performance
(Ahuja, 2000; Mazzola, Perrone and Kamuriwo,
2015; Salman and Saives, 2005; Vanhaverbeke,
Gilsing and Duysters, 2012). For example, Salman
and Saives (2005) found that, by occupying a direct
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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central network position, a ﬁrm is more likely to
access useful knowledge from its direct partners
and increase its innovation performance. Further,
the rate of performance improvement enjoyed by
the ﬁrm is higher when the ﬁrm accesses a greater
number of external resources through is direct ties.
We argue that such performance improvement al-
lows the ﬁrm to keep its independence either by
resisting acquisition or by simply not becoming a
soft takeover target.
Moreover, the signaling effect of direct ties is
subject to diminishing returns (Cohen and Dean,
2005). In other words, at higher levels of direct ties,
additional direct ties would have less signaling im-
pact. At higher levels of direct ties, the signaling
effect is marginally less important, while the re-
source effect is relatively stronger because of the
number of direct ties the ﬁrm can count on. Thus,
for higher levels of direct ties in its ego network,
the likelihood that the ﬁrm will be acquired is sig-
niﬁcantly lower.
Summarizing, we formulate the following hy-
pothesis:
H1: The ﬁrm’s direct ties in its inter-ﬁrm net-
work have an inverted U-shaped relationship to
the likelihood of being acquired.
The role of network prominence
A ﬁrm has a prominent position in its ego network
when it is either directly tied to many other ﬁrms
or connected to ﬁrms who are themselves linked
to many actors (Koka and Prescott, 2008). Sim-
ilarly to our argument above, moderate levels of
prominence (i.e. direct and indirect ties) increase
the ﬁrm’s visibility and quality signals, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood that the ﬁrm will be ac-
quired. However, stronger levels of prominence
denote the ﬁrm’s status, a condition that has been
associated with superior performance (Jensen,
2003; Ozmel, Reuer andGulati, 2013; Shipilov and
Li, 2008) and would consequently lower the ﬁrm’s
likelihood of being acquired. Hence, the overall
impact of a ﬁrm’s network prominence on the
probability that it would be acquired is an inverted
U-shaped relation.
A ﬁrm’s prominence is a visibility-enhancing sig-
nal gained either through the ego’s direct links or
through the connections of highly prominent ﬁrms
with whom the ego is connected. The ﬁrm’s sig-
naling also works indirectly through ﬁrms con-
nected with the ego that are themselves highly con-
nected and are considered reliable and trustwor-
thy sources of information. Prominence is a signal
of unobservable quality (Jensen, 2003) especially
for ﬁrms that are indirectly tied to the focal ﬁrm
and cannot directly observe the quality of the tar-
get ﬁrm. Information asymmetry between a po-
tential acquirer and a prominent target ﬁrm is re-
duced, thus increasing the target ﬁrm’s likelihood
of being acquired. Visibility and quality signals
derived from a target ﬁrm’s prominence are not
restricted to direct ties. Thanks to indirect ties,
the signaling effects derive from the furthest ten-
tacles of the ﬁrm’s ego network (Jensen, 2003;
Ozmel, Reuer andGulati, 2013; Stuart, Hoang and
Hybels, 1999) something which past M&A stud-
ies, based on dyadic relations, have not been able to
assess.
Stronger levels of prominence have been asso-
ciated with status (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999;
Podolny, 2001), a network condition in which the
ﬁrm expresses its power (Bonacich, 1987), inﬂu-
ence and legitimacy (Koka and Prescott, 2008) and
prestige (Ozmel, Reuer and Gulati, 2013; Shipilov
and Li, 2008).
A high-status ﬁrm can improve its performance
through at least three mechanisms. First, the ﬁrm
is in a better position to attract ﬁnancial resources,
from investors and banks, to ﬁnance its develop-
ing programs (Rao et al., 2000). Second, having
a superior standing in the industry, the ﬁrm com-
mands premiumprices as it leverages its reputation
to consumers and other actors for commensurate
returns (Podolny, 1993; Shipilov and Li, 2008). Fi-
nally, when a high-status ﬁrm ties up with a low-
status one, it can ask for compensation as a price
for its cooperation, acquiring in this way valuable
resources at a reduced price.
Furthermore, thanks to the ‘homophily’ mecha-
nism (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001),
a superior status allows the ﬁrm to obtain advan-
tageous positions in resource exchanges with other
ﬁrms. Such a condition reduces ﬁrm’s acquisition
probabilities. Indeed, especially when transaction
uncertainty is relevant, ﬁrms tend to collaborate
with ﬁrms that have similar status. This behavior
reduces the risk of opportunism, because fairness
and commitment are more likely to happen among
partners with similar status (Chung, Singh and
Lee, 2000). However, by tying with a lower-status
partner, a high-status ﬁrm risks adversely affecting
its own status in the considerations of similar
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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status partners. Thus, a high-status ﬁrm is likely
to have inter-organizational relations with other
high-status ﬁrms that are more likely have valuable
resources to exchange. Finally, ﬁrms may use their
high status to lock-in customers to their products,
reducing competitive pressure and in this way
increasing their revenues (Shipilov and Li, 2008).
Summarizing, rising levels of network promi-
nence allow the ﬁrm to enhance its visibility and
quality signals, thus increasing the likelihood of its
acquisition. However, as the ﬁrm becomes highly
prominent, its signaling effect is less relevant, ow-
ing to the diminishing returns effect; thus, the sta-
tus effect dominates and increases the chance of
the ﬁrm’s independence by contemporarily reduc-
ing the likelihood of its own acquisition. Hence, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: The ﬁrm’s prominence in its inter-ﬁrm net-
work has an inverted U-shaped relationship to
the likelihood of being acquired.
The role of an IPO event
An IPO is a signiﬁcant signaling and resource mo-
bilization method that has been highlighted in the
management and entrepreneurship literature, and
it may therefore inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s likelihood of
being subsequently acquired. Thus, it is relevant to
explore how IPOs may interact with a ﬁrm’s net-
work positioning in determining its likelihood of
being acquired.
A wide stream of literature considers IPOs and
takeovers as strictly related to each other. An IPO
has been considered as a signal that a ﬁrm launches
as the ﬁrst stage of an acquisition process (e.g.
Field, 1999; Jain and Kini, 1999). According to
this argument, ﬁrms issue IPOs to obtain a mar-
ket value of their assets – which facilitates the sale
of the ﬁrm – either gradually through a reduction
in ownership or immediately through a subsequent
acquisition. Thus, an IPO works as a signal to
prove the ﬁrm’s value and the quality of the ﬁrm’s
resources through a market evaluation, therefore
increasing the ﬁrm’s likelihood of being acquired
(Brennan and Franks, 1997).
However, through an IPO, a ﬁrm acquires
the necessary resources to develop its growth
strategies, and thus it increases the ﬁrm’s capacity
to resist any future attempts at being taken over
through acquisitions. Moreover, IPO ﬁrms can
take advantage of the cash raised in the IPO,
subsequent access to public ﬁnancing and the
ability to fund any future acquisitions with pub-
licly traded stock to strengthen its position, and
hence reduce any likelihood of being acquired
(Field, 1999; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010).
InHypothesis 1 andHypothesis 2, we argue that
moderate levels of direct ties and network promi-
nence acting, respectively, as visibility-enhancing
and quality signals, push the ﬁrm’s acquisition; but
higher levels of direct ties and prominence, by pro-
viding, respectively, access to resources and ﬁrm’s
status, reduce acquisition probabilities. However,
what is the effect on Hypothesis 1 and Hypothe-
sis 2 when the ﬁrm has undergone an IPO?
We argue that, relative to the ﬁrm’s network
positions such as direct ties and prominence, an
IPO is a stronger visibility-enhancing signal for the
ﬁrm (Pollock and Gulati, 2007). Indeed, ﬁrms that
undergo an IPO become well known to the ﬁnan-
cial, economic and institutional operators. Also,
IPO ﬁrms are highly visible within the industry.
An IPO is also a signal of the quality of the ﬁrm’s
products (Stoughton, Wong and Zechner, 2001)
and its potential sales and earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (Zheng and
Stangeland, 2007). Thus, we can argue that going
through an IPO is such a strong visibility and
quality signal that it completely subsumes the
visibility and quality-signaling role of the ﬁrm’s
network positioning. Therefore, the signaling
impact of direct ties and prominence for IPO ﬁrms
is less relevant, or even irrelevant, than for non
IPO-ﬁrms. Furthermore, because an IPO indu-
bitably provides the ﬁrmwith resources and status,
the likelihood of its acquisition reduces. Indeed,
through an IPO, the ﬁrm obtains the necessary
amount of cash to develop its growth programs.
Such resources are even more signiﬁcant consid-
ering that the ﬁrm can use its ﬁnancial strength to
access further ﬁnancial resources or to use publicly
traded stock to acquire some other external assets.
Thus, the amount of resources obtained through
an IPO makes the ﬁrm stronger and therefore less
vulnerable to acquisition predators.
Finally, much of the IPO research includes a
discussion on the role of the IPO and the ﬁrm’s
status for several reasons (Field, 1999; Field and
Karpoff, 2002; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010;
Pollock and Gulati, 2007). First, an IPO ﬁrm
is included in public lists of funded companies;
this allows the IPO ﬁrm to be differentiated from
other companies and to access, via a ‘homophily’
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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mechanism, value from associating with ﬁrms hav-
ing the same status. Second, the ﬁrm gets access to
ﬁnancial and institutional partners who may help
the ﬁrm to reinforce its reputation. Third, by going
public, the ﬁrm can attract to its board prestigious
directors who may signiﬁcantly contribute to the
prestige and reputation of the ﬁrm. Finally, public
ﬁrms are usually subject to relatively more strin-
gent monitoring and control by authorities, and
this reinforces the reliability and trustworthiness
of the ﬁrm itself. The status obtained through
an IPO allows the ﬁrm to develop takeover de-
fense strategies (Field and Karpoff, 2002). To
conclude, by overshadowing the signaling effect
of direct ties and prominence while additionally
providing resources and status that allow the
ﬁrm to defend itself from takeovers, an IPO may
reduce or even nullify the effect of direct ties and
network prominence on the likelihood of being
acquired.
However, this negative moderating effect is not
symmetric. Indeed, once a ﬁrm has an IPO, how
is it differentiated from other IPO ﬁrms? Network
features can help in this case by providing a com-
plementary signal (Gulati and Higgins, 2003). In
the case of IPO ﬁrms, since they are already visi-
ble, further differentiation among IPO ﬁrms would
involve stronger signals from the network, i.e. a
high level of direct ties and network prominence.
A high level of direct ties may place IPO ﬁrm
in connection with possible acquirers, increasing
the probability to be included in a list of com-
panies to buy. Furthermore, a highly prominent
IPO ﬁrm is differentiated from the others, pro-
viding a ‘network status’ alongside the ‘IPO sta-
tus’. Thus, strong values of direct ties and promi-
nence, by providing complementary signals to an
IPO ﬁrm, allow it to be differentiated from the
other IPO ﬁrms and attenuate the negative effect
of the network features on the likelihood of being
acquired. Summarizing the above reasoning, we
hypothesize:
H3: The curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) re-
lationship between the ﬁrm’s direct ties and
prominence and the likelihood of being acquired
is weaker if the ﬁrm undergoes an IPO. How-
ever, for high values of direct ties/prominence,
the negative moderation effect of the IPO is at-
tenuated.
Figure 1 graphically represents the moderator’s
effect of IPO on the relation between the ﬁrm’s
direct ties/prominence and the probability of be-
ing acquired. Thus, following the considerations
stated in Hypothesis 3, an IPO produces an in-
verted U-shaped relationship nested within (i.e.
vertically under) the relationship (the dotted line
in Figure 1) for the non-IPO case (the contin-
uous line in Figure 1). However, as depicted in
Figure 1, for strong values of direct ties/promi-
nence, this negative moderator effect is attenuated,
as strong direct ties and prominent positions allow
differentiation among IPO ﬁrms, contributing to
signaling them for possible acquisitions.
Research method
Sample and data
We empirically test the hypotheses in the bio-
pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, with the advent
of biotechnologies, pharmaceutical companies
have lagged on research productivity (Brad-
ﬁeld and El-Sayed, 2009; DiMasi, Hansen and
Grabowski, 2003; Goozner, 2004; Rockoff, 2015).
For a pharmaceutical company, transitioning to
new biotechnology research frameworks means a
loss of between 80% and 100% prior knowledge
(Rothaermel, 2001). Thus, these companies have
been acquiring the necessary knowledge and in-
termediate products (patents, technologies, skills)
from biotech ﬁrms through alliances and acqui-
sitions (Al-Laham, Amburgey and Bates, 2008;
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
Small biotechnology ﬁrms have promising novel
intellectual property. However, their dream of
becoming a vertically integrated ‘pharma-like’
company slams against their inability to con-
duct capital-intensive downstream value chain ac-
tivities such as conducting clinical trials, man-
aging the regulatory approval process and ﬁ-
nally commercializing the product. Thus, many
new biopharmaceutical ﬁrms are actually founded
with the speciﬁc intent of generating early-stage
drug discovery and development and then be-
ing sold, sooner or later, to large corporations
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Thus, in recent
decades, researchers have observed a large number
of acquisitions in the biopharmaceutical industry
(Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson, 2007; Higgins
and Rodriguez, 2006). This trend is not yet ex-
hausted – a recent IMAP report indicates that,
for 2013, there were 615 announced and/or closed
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Figure 1. The Effect of IPO on the relationship between direct ties/prominence and ﬁrm’s acquisition
transactions, worth US$100 billion – an increase
of 34% with respect to 2012 (IMAP, 2014).
Our investigation is based on secondary data
collected from the BioWorld database, an online
information service providing daily news and
analysis, stock indices, company coverage, regu-
latory and patent reports, and other information
in the biopharmaceutical industry (Al-Laham,
Amburgey and Bates, 2008; Birch, 2008). We
collected data about any possible biopharma-
ceutical company in the data set from the years
2001–2010. We have excluded from our data set
those ﬁrms that either went out of business or went
through a partial acquisition during the period of
observation. Thus, our ﬁnal data set consists of
2083 ﬁrms, of which 441 (21%) were completely
acquired in the observed period 2001–2010, while
the rest were still independent.
Variable deﬁnitions and operationalization
Dependent and independent variables. The depen-
dent variable,Acqi, is a dummy variable, taking the
value of 1 if the ﬁrm i was acquired in the period
2001–2010, 0 otherwise.
As for our explanatory variables, we built the
network of inter-ﬁrm agreements of the biophar-
maceutical ﬁrms for each year t from 2001 to
2010. Inter-ﬁrm agreements consist of any kind of
inter-organizational relationships (unilateral con-
tracts, bilateral alliances, minor equity alliances,
joint ventures, M&A) recorded and collected from
the BioWorld database. We constructed, for each
year, a network represented by a square matrix
At(nt × nt), where nt is the number of ﬁrms in-
volved in the inter-ﬁrm agreements in the year t.
The generic element of the matrix At, aijt, is equal
to 1, if ﬁrms i and j are involved in an agreement in
the year t, 0 otherwise.
The degree centralitymeasure captures the num-
ber of direct ties connected to the ego ﬁrm, and
it is the most common measure of direct ties cen-
trality in SC literature (Ahuja, 2000; Koka and
Prescott, 2002; Salman and Saives, 2005; Van-
haverbeke, Gilsing and Duysters, 2012; Wu, 2008).
Thus, as a measure of direct ties centrality of a
ﬁrm I, we calculated the average degree, Dgri, of
the ﬁrm i in the years before the acquisition, if the
ﬁrm has been acquired, or in 2010, in cases the ﬁrm
remains independent. Thus, this variable is com-
puted as Dgri =
∑T
t = 2001 Dgr
t
i
T−2000 , where Dgri
t is the
number of different ties (agreements) the ﬁrm i has
at time t, and T is the year before the acquisition of
i if the ﬁrm has been acquired, or is equal to 2010
if the ﬁrm remains independent.
In order to take account of the prominence
of the ﬁrm in its ego-network, we employed the
eigenvector centrality measure (Ahuja, 2000;
Al-Laham, Amburgey and Bates, 2008; Bonacich,
1987; Koka and Prescott, 2002). Eigenvector
centrality refers to the extent to which the ﬁrm’s
centrality depends on the centrality of the ﬁrms to
which it is tied. Hence, a ﬁrm has a high value of
eigenvector centrality if it is connected to many ac-
tors who are themselves connected to many actors.
The eigenvector centrality measure has been com-
monly associated with a ﬁrm’s prominence by sev-
eral SC scholars (Koka and Prescott, 2008; Ozmel,
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Reuer and Gulati, 2013; Shipilov and Li, 2008).
To evaluate the eigenvector centrality of a ﬁrm
at time t, Eigit, we used the ‘Eigenvector’ routine
implemented in UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett
and Freeman, 2002) applied at the year t matrix
At. Again, we computed the average eigenvector
centrality, Eigi, as the average of Eigit at the year
before the acquisition if the ﬁrmhas been acquired,
or at the year 2010, in the case where it has not
been acquired, i.e. Eigi =
∑T
t = 2001 Eig
t
i
T−2000 , T being the
year before the acquisition (if the ﬁrm is acquired)
or 2010 if not. Because of the high dispersion of
this variable, we computed the natural logarithm
of Eigi, so our actual independent variable is
LnEigi.
Control variables. We includedmany other fac-
tors that may inﬂuence the likelihood that a bio-
pharmaceutical ﬁrm will be acquired. First, we
controlled for the Age of the ﬁrm at the year be-
fore its acquisition or at 2010 (if not acquired).
The ﬁrm’s age is an important determinant of
the ﬁrm’s survival probability, because older ﬁrms
have greater market experience, and they are less
likely to be acquired (Evans, 1987; Pennings, Lee
and Van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Second, we con-
trolled for the nationality of the ﬁrm. Our data
set consists of both US biopharmaceutical ﬁrms
(57.7%) and non-US ﬁrms (42.3%). The Ameri-
can biopharmaceutical industry is the most glob-
ally developed (Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson,
2007; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006) and so we ex-
pect USA biopharmaceutical companies to have
a greater chance of being acquired. Thus, we in-
cluded the variable nationality (Nat) as a dummy,
taking value 1 if the ﬁrm is anAmerican one, 0 oth-
erwise. Third, the number of products launched by
the ﬁrm can also inﬂuence the likelihood of its ac-
quisition. Indeed, a product is a signal that the ﬁrm
has successfully integrated the downstream value
chain with the abilities needed to develop new
drugs (Billitteri, LoNigro and Perrone, 2013). Fur-
thermore, biopharmaceutical ﬁrms with launched
products are more likely to have products under
development in their pipeline, and therefore rep-
resent a possible target for pharmaceutical ﬁrms,
in need of ﬁlling their own product pipeline (Dan-
zon, Epstein and Nicholson, 2007; Higgins and
Rodriguez, 2006). Thus, we included a count mea-
sure of new products launched by each ﬁrm from
2001 until the year before the acquisition or at
2010 (if the ﬁrm remains independent). This infor-
mation was retrieved from the product section of
Table 1. Firm size categories and intervals
Size categories Employee intervals
Micro-ﬁrms (MI) 1–10
Very small ﬁrms (VS) 11–50
Small ﬁrms (SM) 51–200
Medium ﬁrms (ME) 201–500
Large ﬁrms (LA) 501–1000
Very large ﬁrms (VL) 1001–5000
Corporation (CO) 5000–10,000
Large corporation (LC) >10,000
BioWorld. We included the logarithm of the num-
ber of products, LnProd, as the control variable.
Fourth, the number of previous collaborations is
one of the most signiﬁcant drivers of acquisitions
(Gulati, 1995, 1998; Hagedoorn, Roijakkers and
Kranenburg, 2006). Thus, we also controlled for
the number of previous collaborations (PrevColl)
that the acquired ﬁrm had with the acquiring ﬁrm.
Fifth, we also controlled for the Size of the ﬁrm.
Larger ﬁrms are less likely to be acquired because
of the inhibitive ﬁnancial resources needed and the
potentially high level of risk involved. We mea-
sured the size of each company by the number its
employees (Powell, 1997). Since we dealt with both
public and private companies, it was not easy to
ﬁnd out the exact number of employees of all the
ﬁrms. Thus, we collected employees’ data in the
year of the ﬁrm’s acquisition or at 2010, if not ac-
quired, using a categorical variable according to
the intervals reported in Table 1. Size data was col-
lected from K10-reports for public ﬁrms and from
several other web resources, such as LinkedIn, for
other ﬁrms.
Sixth, IPOs may also inﬂuence the probabil-
ity of a ﬁrm’s being acquired. We operationalized
IPO as a variable equal to 1 where the ﬁrm went
through an IPO before the acquisition or up to
2010, 0 otherwise. We gathered this information
from the IPO section of the BioWorld database.
We can expect a positive or negative impact of this
variable, respectively, depending on whether the
IPO works as a signal (Brennan and Franks, 1997;
Field, 1999; Jain and Kini, 1999) or mainly as a
source of resources needed to resist possible acqui-
sitions (Field, 1999; Field and Karpoff, 2002; Ho-
vakimian and Hutton, 2010).
We also controlled for the number of patents
and its square. Indeed, literature is quite unani-
mous in considering patents as a signal of quality
for technology ﬁrms (Baum and Silverman,
2004; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008, 2013). Patents
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Figure 2. Number of acquisitions in the observed period (2001–2010)
represent valuable assets that other ﬁrms may be
interested in capturing through an acquisition
(Ali-Yrkko¨, Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2005). Thus,
patents are positively related to acquisition prob-
abilities (Long, 2002). However, patents may also
be a source of revenue that may contribute to the
growth of young start-ups (Helmers and Rogers,
2011). Especially in high-tech industries, many
ﬁrms engage in producing and selling patents to
the downstream knowledge value chain (Lerner,
1995; Mazzola, Bruccoleri and Perrone, 2015;
Pisano, 1990; Powell and Brantley, 1992; Powell,
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996) obtaining a level
of cash needed to resist to possible acquisitions
(Wagner and Cockburn, 2010). Therefore, patents
may have an inverted U-shaped impact on the
likelihood of being acquired. We collected the
number of patents developed by the ﬁrm from
2001 to the year before its acquisition or at 2010
(if not acquired) from the United State Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) database. Because of
the high dispersion of this variable, we used the
natural logarithm of the patent number, LnPat,
and its square, LnPatSqr.
Finally, we attempted to control for the year of
acquisition in order to check for possible inﬂu-
ence of acquisition trends in some particular years.
However, controlling for the years introduces a
perfect collinearity with the dependent variable
just because each year variable would predict a per-
fect success (a value of 1) of the dependent vari-
able. Thus, we analyzed year-speciﬁc behaviors in
order to locatewhether some years could introduce
some singularity into our data. Figure 2 shows how
acquisitions in the observed years (2001–2010)
present a clear growing trend, but no years seem
to explain acquisitions better than others.
Findings
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and the
correlations between all the variables. All the cor-
relation coefficients between the independent vari-
ables are quite low. To assess the potential threat
of collinearity, we estimated the variance inﬂation
factors (VIFs) and found that no variable had a
VIF greater than 2.56, which is below the recom-
mended ceiling of 10 (Stevens, 1992).
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous,
we can run a probit or logit regression (Hoetker,
2007). The choice between logit and probit mod-
els is largely one of convenience and convention,
since both the models tend to produce very simi-
lar predictions, and the results are generally indis-
tinguishable (Long, 1997). In this paper, we used a
probit estimation. Table 3 provides an overview of
the results.
The baseline model (model 1) shows the effects
of control variables. Models 2 and 3 test for the
main effect (Dgr) and squared effect (DgrSqr) of
the degree centrality, respectively. The main ef-
fect of eigenvector centrality (LnEig) is reported
in model 4, while its square effect is reported in
model 5 (LnEigSqr). Model 6 puts together the
variables under investigation, Dgr and LnEig and
their squared terms. Model 7 tests the interac-
tions between Dgr and IPO, and between DgrSqr
and IPO, while model 8 tests the interaction be-
tweenLnEig and IPO, and the interaction between
LnEigSqr and IPO. The model ﬁtting increases
each time the explanatory variables, both plain and
squared, and the interaction terms are introduced.
All the control variables, except LnProd, are sig-
niﬁcant (model 1). The coefficient of Age is neg-
ative, and thus, as expected, older ﬁrms are less
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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Table 3. Results of the probit analysis
Probability of being acquired – Probit models
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
Age −0.00477† −0.00388 −0.00415† −0.00471† −0.00430† −0.00379 −0.00444† −0.00447†
(0.00252) (0.00241) (0.00245) (0.00251) (0.00245) (0.00239) (0.00248) (0.00250)
Nat 0.221** 0.202** 0.201** 0.217** 0.203** 0.189** 0.202** 0.200**
(0.0692) (0.0698) (0.0700) (0.0694) (0.0697) (0.0702) (0.0699) (0.0698)
LnProd 0.235 0.0971 0.163 0.220 0.247† 0.185 0.179 0.238
(0.148) (0.165) (0.149) (0.152) (0.141) (0.147) (0.155) (0.148)
PrevColl 2.967*** 2.894*** 2.918*** 2.914*** 2.967*** 2.930*** 2.931*** 2.954***
(0.289) (0.289) (0.296) (0.292) (0.333) (0.328) (0.300) (0.295)
VS 0.305* 0.285* 0.284* 0.294* 0.272* 0.263* 0.284* 0.261*
(0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
SM 0.510*** 0.474*** 0.466*** 0.501*** 0.473*** 0.444*** 0.462*** 0.460***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)
ME 0.286† 0.236 0.230 0.276 0.242 0.206 0.222 0.246
(0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.175) (0.175)
LA 0.378† 0.266 0.273 0.353† 0.336 0.256 0.278 0.318
(0.206) (0.212) (0.211) (0.208) (0.209) (0.214) (0.212) (0.209)
VL 0.338† 0.244 0.258 0.323 0.288 0.228 0.262 0.270
(0.202) (0.206) (0.204) (0.201) (0.200) (0.203) (0.205) (0.201)
CO 0.365 0.368 0.355 0.398 0.391 0.373 0.369 0.385
(0.297) (0.299) (0.303) (0.296) (0.295) (0.301) (0.299) (0.293)
LC 0.396 0.401† 0.391 0.336 0.344 0.367 0.373 0.335
(0.247) (0.242) (0.241) (0.249) (0.244) (0.239) (0.243) (0.248)
IPO −0.539*** −0.560*** −0.566*** −0.539*** −0.540*** −0.564*** −0.550*** −0.439***
(0.0986) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0994) (0.0998) (0.102) (0.0998) (0.104)
LnPat 0.0621* 0.0501† 0.0437 0.0531† 0.0443 0.0339 0.0435 0.0446
(0.0300) (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0302)
PatSqr −0.0737* −0.0916* −0.0811* −0.0750* −0.0779* −0.0860* −0.0734* −0.0746*
(0.0334) (0.0362) (0.0354) (0.0338) (0.0345) (0.0362) (0.0352) (0.0345)
Dgr 0.302*** 0.455*** 0.373*** 0.538***
(0.0574) (0.0833) (0.0877) (0.104)
DgrSqr −0.0274** −0.0195† −0.0339*
(0.00919) (0.0108) (0.0154)
LnEig 4.738** 16.46*** 12.68*** 21.49***
(1.540) (3.445) (3.707) (4.397)
LnEigSqr −0.0679*** −0.0574** −0.0936**
(0.0181) (0.0214) (0.0295)
Ipo × Dgr −0.264†
(0.136)




Ipo × LnEigSqr 0.0914*
(0.0406)
Cons −1.255*** −1.565*** −1.727*** −1.264*** −1.259*** −1.642*** −1.825*** −1.265***
(0.122) (0.135) (0.151) (0.122) (0.122) (0.154) (0.167) (0.122)
Wald Chi2 189.56 214.09 219.43 192.09 173.84 202.64 237.91 219.87
Pseudo R2 0.1588 0.1718 0.1740 0.1626 0.1697 0.1799 0.1759 0.1727
Log pseudo
likelihood
−905.66 −891.61 −889.23 −901.54 −893.89 −882.93 −887.17 −890.63
N 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083
Standard errors in parentheses. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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likely to be acquired. The coefficient of Nat is pos-
itive, meaning that US ﬁrms are more likely to
be acquired. Previous collaborations (PrevColl), as
largely expected, have a positive impact on the like-
lihood of being acquired. The Size of the ﬁrm is
also signiﬁcant. Indeed, where the category micro-
ﬁrms (MI) is assumed as a baseline, the results
show that having smaller dimensions, until the cat-
egory small ﬁrms (SM), has a positive and signiﬁ-
cant effect on the probability of being acquired. In
accordance with the stream of literature that con-
siders IPO as a source of resources, we get a nega-
tive and signiﬁcant impact of the IPO on the like-
lihood of being acquired. Finally, in line with our
conjecture, patents have an inverted U-shaped ef-
fect on the likelihood of being acquired.
In Hypothesis 1, we argued that direct ties have
an inverted U-shaped effect on the ﬁrm’s proba-
bility of being acquired; the coefficient of Dgr is
positive and signiﬁcant in model 2, while the co-
efficient of DgrSqr is negative and signiﬁcant in
model 3, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypoth-
esis 2 argued that network prominence, measured
through the ﬁrm’s eigenvector centrality, has an
inverted U-shaped effect on the ﬁrm’s probability
of being acquired; the coefficient of LnEig is posi-
tive and signiﬁcant in model 4, while the coefficient
of LnEigSqr is negative and signiﬁcant in model
5, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. Moreover, Hy-
pothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 received further con-
ﬁrmation from model 6 where all the explanatory
variables (Dgr, DgrSqr, LnEig and LnEigSqr) are
introduced together, and they continue to be highly
signiﬁcant and with the expected signs.
Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the re-
sults concerning Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
An inverted U-shaped relationship exists if Y ﬁrst
increases with X at a decreasing rate to reach a
maximum, after which Y decreases at an increas-
ing rate. The point at which the curve attains its
maximum is the ‘turning point’, and it needs to
be located well within the data range (Lind and
Mehlum, 2010). We tested this assumption follow-
ing the procedure described in the recent paper
by Haans, Pieters and He (2015) on the use of
U-shaped relations in strategic management liter-
ature, and affirmed our results as shown in Figures
3a and 3b.
Models 7 and 8 exhibit a negative, and
signiﬁcant, linear interaction between IPO
and,respectively, Dgr and LnEig. The interaction
between DgrSqr and IPO in model 7 is not sig-
niﬁcant, while the interaction between IPO and
LnEigSqr is signiﬁcant and positive. These results
conﬁrm, only for LnEig, our prediction of Hy-
pothesis 3 that an IPO makes the relation between
prominence and the probability of being acquired
weaker, when prominence does not assume strong
values. Indeed, as clearly shown in Figure 4,
for moderate levels of eigenvector centrality, the
green dots are signiﬁcantly under the red ones,
meaning that when the ﬁrm goes through an IPO,
the probability of being acquired is signiﬁcantly
lower than when it does not go through an IPO.
However, when the eigenvector centrality reaches
high levels, the negative moderation effect of the
IPO is attenuated as predicted by Hypothesis 3.
Discussion and conclusion
Our study offers three contributions to the SC
literature. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst research to address the impact
of the ﬁrm’s network positions on its likelihood
of being acquired. Previous studies in SC liter-
ature have examined the ﬁrm’s survival (Bru¨derl
and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998;Mitchell and Singh, 1996;
Uzzi, 1996; Watson, 2007), the ﬁrm’s dissolution
(Pennings, Lee and VanWitteloostuijn, 1998), and
the ﬁrm’s propensity tomake acquisitions ormerg-
ers (Haunschild, 1993; Hoang, 1997; Lin et al.,
2009; Yang, Lin and Peng, 2011). Our study is
aligned with prior ﬁndings that show a positive
impact of SC on the ﬁrm’s survival (e.g. Bru¨derl
and Preisendo¨rfer, 1998), and it extends previ-
ous research showing how and why the ﬁrm’s di-
rect ties and prominence provide a signal that
catalyzes its acquisition. We explain the mecha-
nism through which this happens, i.e. how the
visibility-enhancing effect of direct ties is subse-
quently dampened by the network resources effect,
resulting in an overall inverted U-shaped relation.
Similarly, the quality signaling effect of promi-
nence is subsequently reversed by network-status
resulting in an overall inverted U-shaped relation.
Although these two centrality features exhibit
the same behaviors, as Figures 3a and 3b and
a comparison of their standardized coefficients
show, the inﬂuence of the eigenvector centrality
(a standardized coefficient of −0.218) seems to be
much stronger than that of the degree centrality (a
standardized coefficient of−0.088) in decreasing a
ﬁrm’s probability of being acquired. This result is
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
Probability of Being Acquired 13
Figure 3. (a) Probability of being acquired vs. degree centrality; (b) probability of being acquired vs. eigenvector centrality
Figure 4. IPO effects on the probability of being acquired vs. eigenvector centrality
quite interesting considering that, for instance, nei-
ther Ahuja (2000) nor Salman and Saives (2005)
found appreciable differences between direct cen-
trality and eigenvector centrality in driving inno-
vation outputs such as patents. Our study seems
to indicate that, at least with respect to acquisition
probabilities, they have different strengths. To ex-
plain this ﬁnding, we suggest that, on the one hand,
direct ties expose the ﬁrm directly to partners that
may be possible buyers; thus, even if the ﬁrm gains
access to resources through its network, its expo-
sure to possible buyers has a relatively more telling
effect. On the other hand, highly prominent ﬁrms
may enjoy advantages of status and are less ex-
posed to effects of direct relations. Another reason
could be that the status effect is just stronger than
the resource effect in protecting the ﬁrm from be-
ing acquired. For instance, the beneﬁts from net-
work status extend to a wider portion of the net-
work, while access to resources is largely provided
by direct ties limited to the neighborhood of the
ego ﬁrm. This different explanation of the ﬁndings
calls for deeper research.
These results have important managerial impli-
cations – at least in the biopharmaceutical context.
Direct ties and prominence are a double-edged
sword. A ﬁrm’s inter-ﬁrm network position can en-
hance its visibility and signal its quality, and thus
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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improve its likelihood of being acquired. At the
same time, as the ﬁrm achieves strong centrality
positions, it is likely that the network also provides
sufficient resources and status to assure the inde-
pendence of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, as previously
mentioned, prominence seems to provide a better
defense against acquisitions.
Second, our study enhances the SC literature
by including SC as a source of valuable signals
for ﬁrms. Indeed, while the SC literature has con-
sidered relational embeddedness as a source of
valuable signals (e.g. Gulati and Higgins, 2003),
only the recent study by Ozmel, Reuer and Gu-
lati (2013) has examined structural embeddedness
features as a source of signals for a ﬁrm. However,
they limited the analysis to one dimension of struc-
tural embeddedness – the ﬁrm’s prominence, i.e.
the eigenvector centrality feature. Our study builds
on their work and shows that direct ties also signal
the value of the focal ﬁrm.
Furthermore, our work shows how even moder-
ate values of direct ties and network prominence
are able to provide a visibility-enhancing signal.
The signaling effect of a ﬁrm’s network position
has an asymptotic behavior whose marginal im-
pact on the likelihood of its acquisition progres-
sively decreases, the more the ﬁrm’s two network
positions strengthen.Moreover, our study suggests
a dynamic of the signaling effect of network posi-
tions. At moderate levels of direct ties and network
prominence, the ﬁrm acquires visibility and sig-
nals its quality. However, both visibility and qual-
ity signals marginally decrease in their importance,
at least in increasing the ﬁrm’s acquisition proba-
bility, once they reach stronger values.
Finally, by analyzing the interactions between
the ﬁrm’s network positions and whether or not
it undertakes an IPO, we contribute to a better
understanding of the impact of multiple signals
on the ﬁrm’s likelihood of being acquired. Our
results show that an IPO subsumes the signal-
ing impact of prominence and weakens its effect
on the ﬁrm’s probability of being acquired. This
result adds new knowledge to the literature that
places IPOs in relation to acquisition probabili-
ties. In line with the literature on IPO as a source
of resources and status that places the ﬁrm in a
better position to resist acquisitions (e.g. Field,
1999), we show how, for moderate levels of promi-
nence, an IPO acts as a perfect substitute for the
visibility-enhancing and quality signal provided
by the network position. However, higher values
of network prominence signal the status of the
ﬁrm (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Jain and Kini,
1999), and allow the ﬁrm to stand out from the
crowd of IPO ﬁrms, and thereby improve the likeli-
hood of being acquired. Direct centrality though,
even when it directly exposes the ﬁrm to possible
buyers (Hypothesis 3), does not seem to provide
complementing signals for either IPO or non-IPO
ﬁrms. Of course, these results have signiﬁcantman-
agerial implications. First, IPO events completely
change the impact of direct ties and prominence on
the ﬁrm’s likelihood of being acquired, indicating
that managers need to re-consider the impact of
their network strategies when dealing with an IPO.
Second, direct ties and prominence have slightly
different interactions, with prominence the only
variable that is really more involved in interaction
with IPO.
This study has some limitations that, in turn,
present future opportunities for development of
this work. First, we focused on direct ties and
prominence as structural embeddedness network
features; however, bridging structural holes are a
network feature that has raised several research
contributions among SC scholars (e.g. Ahuja,
2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Thus, understand-
ing the effect of structural holes on the likelihood
of being acquired would complete the theoretical
framework. Second, our study did not consider a
relational perspective (i.e. the typology of the re-
lation) of the inter-ﬁrm agreements, as this issue
has been previously addressed in the alliance lit-
erature (e.g. Afuah, 2001; Anderson et al., 2001;
Haunschild, 1994). Our focus was on network
positioning. However, further studies can investi-
gate how relational and network position inﬂuence
each other with respect to acquisition probability.
Third, we did not consider the level of success of
an IPO. A much better operationalization of the
IPO variable could offer amore comprehensive un-
derstanding of the quality of the IPO signal. Fi-
nally, because the intentionwas to analyze the rela-
tionship between the ﬁrm’s network position in its
inter-ﬁrm network and the probability of being ac-
quired, this study focused on the biopharmaceuti-
cal industry, in which inter-ﬁrm networks are a rel-
atively common phenomenon (Rothaermel, 2001),
and the company sale is more than an exit strategy
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Thus, although
this approach is appropriate, it would be unwise to
generalize the ﬁndings too broadly to other indus-
tries and cultural contexts.
© 2016 British Academy of Management.
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